Rather than attempting to explain the occurrence of consciousness via the primacy of matter, this work attempts to derive an objective, external, physical world from the occurrence of first-person awareness. To do so, at least three principles that are not currently in favor will be made use of: the occurrence of free will, teleological determinacy, and a type of formal determinacy to be herein termed “formational determinacy” (wherein the form determines the organization and processes of its constituents).
By the author’s appraisal, among the ready-established metaphysical systems which this work most closely resembles are those of objective idealism as specified by the pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce—namely, such that physicality is considered to be effete mind whose natural laws are global habits—and of Neoplatonism, in particular the Neoplatonic notion of “the One” or, else termed, “the Good”. Overlaps with other metaphysical systems, such as that of Buddhism, can also be found. Of potential note, given these similarities, to the typical atheist this work might be interpreted as being of a theistic mindset while, to the typical theist, the same contents might be interpreted as espousing an atheistic philosophy.
Likewise by the author’s appraisal, among this work’s greatest strengths will be its explanatory power in addressing topics of value theory, including that of meta-ethics.
Among the most prominent challenges associated with this work will be the requirement that one let go of today’s commonplace presumptions—both implicit and explicit—of a physicalist ontology. To arrive at certain conclusions, collectively exhaustive ontological possibilities will often be appraised—with many of these possibilities being noncredible, if at all imaginable, from a physicalist worldview. Furthermore, the conclusions thereby obtained will at times contradict physicalist suppositions—as can be exemplified by the conclusion of free will’s occurrence and the teleological determinacy this entails. Nevertheless, it will be via these same, non-physicalist conclusions that the reality of an objective, physical world will be derived—this together with derivations of a compatibilist system wherein a formational determinacy between mind and brain unfolds.
This philosophy’s novel approach upholds the otherwise scientific principle of falsifiability for all its pivotal conclusions: All obtained conclusions that affirm to be of a falsifiable epistemic certainty are thereby certainties devoid of any known justifiable alternatives, and can each be formally falsified as being an epistemic certainty simply via the provision of any justifiable alternative to that which it claims. Standing in contrast to epistemic certainties which are supposed to be infallible (hence, impossible to be in any way wrong), such falsifiable epistemic certainties constitute a newly discerned form of maximal certainty, one which this philosophy uncovers and, for ease of expression, coins “unfalsified certainty” (as is described in the work’s Chapter 1).
The first-person unfalsified certainty of “I—as a first-person point of view—am whenever I am in any way aware” then both serves a) as an example of unfalsified certainties in general (for no one here concerned can so far provide a justifiable alternative to their occurrence as a first-person point of view while in any way aware of anything, including while being aware of any such supposedly justifiable alternative (this as is addressed with greater detail in the work’s Chapter 4)) and b) as the second unfalsified certainty this philosophy provides upon which the three volumes of this work are founded (the first unfalsified certainty provided being that we must uphold the law of noncontradiction without exception if reasoning is to be in any way rationally deemed efficacious for us (this as is established in the work’s Chapter 3)).
The cumulative philosophical worldview of this work, then, will be found to coincide with many aspects of C. S. Peirce’s notions regarding objective idealism; to rationally support what in Neo-Platonism is termed “the Good”; to evidence what in Aristotelianism is termed “the unmoved mover” of all that exists, and this within a fundamentally teleological cosmos; to logically confirm the reality of our metaphysical free will; to comprehensively explain meta-ethics together with the problem of evil; to clarify how the immaterial mind is determined by, and can in turn influence, the material body; to self-consistently justify the three basic laws of thought (the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle) via the ontological nature of the world as previously derived in the work; to provide a satisfactory explanation of what epistemological subjects such as those of reasoning, correctitude, justification, and knowledge consist of; to provide a stringent metaphysical grounding for the necessity of biological evolution; and—among the work’s many other merits—to provide means for analytically addressing the possibility of spiritual realms in logical manners while, likewise, providing solid metaphysical support and explanation for physical objectivity as well as, subsequently, providing solid epistemological grounding for the scientific method and its results.
With that said, one of this work’s leading unresolved issues will be the metaphysical explanation of how life—and the awareness that life is deemed to entail—evolved from nonlife. Notwithstanding, in part because this work derives a metaphysical requirement for biological evolution, and in part because intrinsic to this overall work will be an epistemological obligation to honor data obtained from all branches of empirical science regarding objective reality, this work will staunchly conclude that life did indeed emerge from out of a universe that once was devoid of lifeforms. Due to the logical implications of this conclusion as derived from both the ontological and epistemological tenets to be herein presented, the work will then culminate in a generalized hypothesis of panpsychism, one whose metaphysical details await to be resolved.
Please feel free to critique this philosophy’s conclusions and see if you can in fact falsify any of its as of yet unfalsified certainties.
Michael W Moiceanu 